7/26/13 Egypt Post Morsi: Why There Is No Reason to Hope for a Real Democratic Transition
In the deluge of interpretations that have surrounded the ousting of President Morsi, some are semantic: “Is it a coup?” Others are irrelevant: “Does it show, yet again, that Islam is not compatible with democracy?” The most significant for the political future of Egypt assert that the end of the regime portends the end of Islamism, and that the military has returned to power. But a closer look at the political and social evolution of both Islamism and the army before and after the revolution actually shows that neither statement holds on solid ground.
This is not the end of Islamism. The defeat of this multifaceted movement has been prophesized for at least the last two decades — Olivier Roy, for example, wrote The Failure of Political Islam in 1999. To assume its end in the current Egyptian context is to limit Islamism to the Freedom and Justice party (FJP), which was not even created until after the 2011 revolution. Islamism is first and foremost a social movement. In the last four decades, Egyptian society has been the major field of action of the Muslim Brothers as they built networks, associations, and social programs. In this regard, its perspective has always been larger and more inclusive than factional politics. And it is probably why, when the party was created, a lot of the younger people within the movement were adamant to not put all their resources into the party. As they rightly assumed, a social movement often looses its holistic approach once it enters electoral competition. That is exactly what happened with the FJP. Additionally, most of the senior leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) lack the skills for governance because running a social movement is very different from professional politics.